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Abstract: The uneven exploitation of scarce natural resources threatens their sustainability by
altering the commitment of agents. In fisheries, a great portion of catches is known to be concentrated
in a few countries. Aiming to provide a more complete view on the distributional issues associated
to the exploitation of common marine resources, this article focuses on the analysis of catches from
high seas, which can be understood as the common marine resources under the current legislation.
The analysis focuses on the evolution of several inequality indexes (the Gini index as well as others
from the Atkinson and General Entropy families) from 1960 to 2014. Additionally, the Theil index
is decomposed to observe whether this inequality is given by biological (between inequality) or
technological (within inequality) reasons. All inequality indexes confirm that the exploitation of
fishing resources in high seas is very unequal across countries. However, this inequality has decreased
between 29% and 65% from 1960 to 2014. When considering the origin of catches, between 46% and
82% of the inequality observed is due to technological and fishermen capacity differences across
the countries operating within fishing areas, while between 18% and 54% of the inequality can be
attributed to biological differences between the fishing areas. Over time, the within component has
decreased more than 35%, reflecting the greater reliance of more countries on high seas fisheries
and their catching up on fishing technology. Being aware on the existence and the nature of catches
inequality observed is necessary to develop successful policies for maintaining the sustainability of
the fishery resources.
Keywords: catches; fisheries; geographical fishing areas; high seas; inequality measures; international
inequality; Theil’s decomposition
JEL Classification: D39; Q22
1. Introduction
Fish is a resource that is increasingly relevant to our lives. The United Nations Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimates that fish accounted for nearly 17% of the animal proteins
consumed by the global population in 2015. It is also widely utilized in non-food products such as
fishmeal, fish oil, products for pharmaceutical uses and directly as raw material for animal feeds [1].
Conserving it is, therefore, not only a matter of concern for the estimated 56.6 million people who
depend directly on the sector, and international organizations are increasingly striving to preserve this
natural resource. Indeed, the sustainable exploitation of oceans, seas and marine ecosystems has been
set as one of the Aichi Targets for 2020 in the Convention on Biological Diversity [2] and as one of the
Sustainable Development Goals established by the United Nations for the year 2030 [3].
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Aquaculture is becoming more important in the production of fish, but the amount of fish catches
is still impressive. Indeed, in 2015, global catches exceeded 90 million tons, 170% higher than in
1960. The biggest increase happened from 1960 to 1990, and since then catches have remained almost
stable. The decrease in production and subsequent collapse suffered already by several fish stocks are
well documented [4]. The FAO estimates that the current exploitation of around 31% of fish stocks is
unsustainable and warns that the production of fish will only increase if recovery programs for fish
stocks are implemented successfully [5]. Even if implemented, effects will not be immediate as the
frequent time needed for the recovery of fisheries doubles and even triples the life span of species [1].
Thus, preserving current ecosystems becomes crucial for the future availability of resources.
Following the concept of Mare Liberum (or The Freedom of the Seas) from Hugo Grotius [6], the sea
was viewed as a common resource free to all, so nobody could be denied its right to navigate or exploit
it. Nevertheless, the need for preserving the marine resources supplanted this view by the concept
Mare Clausum, which was reflected in the international law developments during the last century.
After some countries unilaterally declared the ownership of their coastal waters after World War II,
there was a need for regulating the property rights of the nearby coastline waters. This was formally
encoded in the United Nations Convention in the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS [7]) which states that each
coastal country has jurisdiction over the natural resources in the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs)
defined as their adjacent 200 nautical miles waters.
After the restrictions imposed by the UNCLOS many countries lost part of the fishing grounds
where they used to fish and, in some cases, they could only further fish in certain areas after buying
fishing rights. The new status quo led to a clear expansion of fishing activities from the EEZs to
the “high seas”, i.e., to the international waters beyond the EEZs of coastal countries, which make
up almost 60% of the oceans. As a result, the share of high seas fisheries on total catches increased
from 0.73% in 1960 to almost 2.6% in 2014. High seas catches do not seem to play a large role in
food security given the type of species caught and the main fishing entities benefited from these
resources [8]. Nevertheless, the positive trend in the level of catches coming from high seas and in the
amount of countries exploiting these areas [9] indicates that we must not disregard the relevance of
these resources. Indeed, despite having slightly experienced the decrease observed in overall catches
from 2000 to 2010, high seas catches have recovered and currently continue growing at an annual rate
of almost 3%.
Despite the UNCLOS regulation, several studies suggest that the historical management of coastal
fisheries has been unable to preserve fish stocks, resulting in strong negative impacts on coastal
ecosystems [10,11]. Consequently, most countries have developed recovery programs for the fisheries
allocated in their EEZs. This is the case of the European Union (EU), which factored multi-annual
recovery plans for certain fish stocks into the Common Fisheries Policy reform of 2002 in an attempt
to promote sustainable fisheries management [12–14]. The United States also charged the US Fish
and Wildlife Service with developing plans to recover the species listed in the US Endangered Species
Act [15].
Such policies are more difficult to implement on the high seas, which are governed by international
entities formed by countries with fishing interests in an area, named Regional Fisheries Management
Organizations (RFMO). Some of them manage all the fish stocks located in a specific area (e.g.,
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO)), while others focus on particular highly-migratory
species across vast geographical areas (e.g., Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC). Apart from the
new legislation, several other factors have contributed to the transition from coastal to high seas
fishing, e.g., the overcapacity of the fleets that led to the overexploitation of coastal waters [16],
the technological development of the fishing vessels that made available the utilization of the
deep-sea stocks [17,18], and the government subsidization to the long-distance fleets that artificially
increased their profitability [19]. Overall, management policies implemented by RFMO to control the
consequences of this expansion have been proven insufficient to prevent the depletion of high seas
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stocks. According to Cullis-Suzuki and Pauly [20], two-thirds of the stocks fished on the high seas and
under RFMO management are either depleted or overexploited.
Despite the interest shown for the trends in catches, research literature has paid little attention to
distributional issues associated with fisheries exploitation of the common marine resources. Data on
high seas catches reveal significant dissimilarities between the exploitation of different fishing areas
and countries. Particularly, the data seem to indicate that high seas catches are concentrated in a small
number of countries and fishing areas but this concentration decreased from 1960 to 2014. The new
status quo defined by the UNCLOS in 1982 seems to be the main factor affecting this trend. Restrictions
imposed by UNCLOS made that new countries started fishing in more productive fishing areas on the
high seas; as time goes by, the more advanced technology required to access these fisheries becomes
available for more countries.
Distributional concerns have focused mostly on income distribution. However, such concerns
have recently been expanded to explaining how the use of scarce natural resources and environmental
capacity are distributed across countries. Azar et al. [21] proposed a systematic framework of indicators
for sustainability that focuses on just distribution of resources, not income. Although equatable
distributions do not imply equal distributions, they suggest an indicator for intragenarational justice
that compares the resources per capita used for a region (e.g., a country) to the amount per capita used
for the world. Such an indicator implies that equality in the distribution of the resources is desirable
for sustainability.
Traditionally, the management of international cooperation aspects has relied on the external
imposition of actions and sanctions to countries. Nowadays, more flexible agreements are being
developed to enhance the commitment of countries in the global sustainability. Nevertheless,
accomplishing successful international cooperation in this frame requires the feeling of reciprocity,
fairness and trust among participants. In this sense, heterogeneity in the distribution of the resources
hardens the establishment of a common goal satisfying optimal conditions for all participants.
This detriments the perception of fairness, reciprocity and trust, diminishing the willingness of
countries to cooperate in international agreements for the conservation of the environment [22].
Moreover, the link between the unequal use of the resource and the participation on cooperative
agreement is bidirectional. Owusu et al. [23] found that a non-cooperative behavior among the resource
users drives to higher unequal harvests leading to a downward spiral of resource overexploitation
and scarcity. Along the same lines, Drupp et al. [24] concluded that valuation of nature should
explicitly account for economic inequality and encompassing assessments of the distributional effects of
environmental policies must consider the distribution of non-market environmental benefits. From the
point of view of fisheries management, Fabinyi et al. [25] found evidence, based on case-studies,
that fishers are aware of and keen to act on resource sustainability. However, this predisposition
is overridden by distributional concerns over who obtains benefits from the fishery. While more
homogeneous distributions of resources may contribute to their sustainability by facilitating the
accomplishment of agreements, the preservation of marine resources is affected by many other factors
that should not be disregarded.
There is a large body of literature on the international distribution of natural resource use
and environmental capacity. A non-exhaustive list includes articles about the distribution of CO2,
SO2 and NOx emissions [26–29], ecological footprint [30], energy intensity [31–33] and material
resources [34]. In these studies, the traditional income inequality measures are applied for the analysis
of distributional issues associated with resources or environmental goods. Considering fisheries as a
scarce natural resource whose sustainability requires from the international cooperation, the present
analysis extends this research approach to show the fishery resources distribution from the point of
view of the exploitation. This may be of great relevance in designing policies aimed at preserving the
marine ecosystem.
For this purpose, we focus on the distributional analysis of catches from high seas, which can be
understood as the common marine resources stricto sensus, since the current legislation (UNCLOS [7])
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on fisheries declared the EEZs as reserved areas to the respective country. The analysis is developed
around two aspects. Firstly, the distribution of high seas catches across countries from 1960 to 2014 is
studied using several inequality indexes. Secondly, the analysis seeks to learn whether the inequality
observed in the distribution of high seas catches is due to the biological differences between the
geographical areas where fleets operate or to the idiosyncrasies of countries (the type of fishing gears
used, the characteristics of vessels, the amount of fishing labor, their preferences, the ownership of
coastal fisheries, etc.). To address this second aspect, we make use of the properties of the Theil
index, which enables inequality to be decomposed into different levels. To measure the use of
fishery resources, Azar et al. [21] proposed considering the population of countries as well as their
catches. When considering the catches of countries jointly with their population, it is accounted the
fact that larger societies may require more resources to cover their needs than smaller ones. As a
result, the exploitation of fisheries from countries with heterogenous population can be compared
avoiding the effects of the dissimilarity in their society sizes. For this reason, the distributional analyses
implemented in this study weight the catches of countries by their population.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 details the data and the methodology used
in this analysis. Section 3 starts by looking at the main initial messages that can be drawn from the
data. In particular, it overviews the trends in high seas catches, their relationship with the population
and how they are distributed across the different fishing areas and countries. Once the context is
analyzed, the evolution of inequality indexes and the Theil decomposition are presented. Finally,
Section 4 presents our conclusions.
2. Materials and Methods
2.1. Data
To perform this analysis, we rely on the fishery catches provided by the Sea Around Us project [35].
This dataset provides reconstructed series of fishery catches that combine official reported data,
mainly from the FAO, and reconstructed estimates of unreported data (including major discards) [36].
Apart from the corresponding fishing entities, these data allow distinguishing the areas where the
catches occur. This is particularly convenient to address the analysis for high seas catches, which
requires eliminating those captures coming from the EEZs regulated by the UNCLOS [7] from the
FAO fishing areas. Another advantage of this dataset is that it keeps the same countries along the
period. The catch series have been reconstructed backwards for the countries that emerge from the
break-up of old countries such as the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia or Sudan. For the
purpose of our analysis, we consider the catches from marine fisheries reported as landings from a
total of 167 countries for which Sea Around Us offers data over the analyzed period, 1960 to 2014.
Since we are looking for the unequal exploitation of a common resource across countries, all recorded
catches from high seas are considered, independently of their future use (consumption or trade) and
their monetary value.
The efficiency with which resources are being used to cover all the needs in a society is one of the
principles that must guide any policy targeting the sustainability of such resources [21]. Since it is not
possible to attribute directly the use of fishery resources to each member of the society, the catches of
countries are assumed to be equally distributed across their population. Technically, this is equivalent
to weight the catches of countries by their population. Data on the population of countries is taken
from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank [37]. In this regard, it is worth mentioning
that the countries that are left out of the analysis, due to lack of data on catches, represent less than
10% of the global population.
2.2. Methodology
Following the suggestion of Duro [27], we use a battery of inequality indexes to achieve more
robust results. First, we build the Lorenz curves for 1960 and 2014, which provide a graphic view on
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how inequality in the distribution of high seas catches changes from one year to another. Then, we
observe the trend in inequality by quantifying several indexes over the course of the period. Finally,
we analyze how much of this quantified inequality can be explained by differences between fishing
areas or by differences between countries within those areas. This distinction can be measured via the
decomposition property of the Theil index. Bellanger et al. [38] applied a similar approach to study the
distributional effects of quota management on vessel production when the vessels are classified by
subfleets or length classes.
2.3. Inequality Metrics
An easy way to show the dispersion of high seas catches around the world is to graph a Lorenz
curve [39]. This graph displays the information contained in a cross-tabulation of shares of catches
and countries (or countries weighted by population). It relates the cumulative proportion of countries
to the cumulative proportion of fishing catches, assuming that countries are arranged in increasing
order of catches. A completely egalitarian distribution is represented by a diagonal line. The nearer the
curve of the distribution is to this diagonal line, the more egalitarian the distribution is. The Lorenz
curve is a powerful tool for inequality metrics because it enables the distributions of two populations
to be compared. When the Lorenz curves of two distributions are displayed in the same graph and do
not cross, it can be claimed unequivocally that the population with the curve closer to the diagonal is
more egalitarian than the other. This claim can be extended to the case in which the Lorenz curves
intersect under certain conditions.
Apart from this graphic analysis, distributional concerns can be measured objectively using
inequality indexes. An inequality index can be understood as a distance function that aggregates
the frequencies of a distribution in a particular manner. However, any inequality index fulfills four
basic properties: (i) anonymity (it does not matter which individual has each level of resources);
(ii) population invariance (if the population is replicated, the inequality index does not vary); (iii) scale
invariance (when a proportional change is applied to the whole distribution, the index reflects
the same level of inequality); and (iv) the Pigou–Dalton transfer principle (the index will show a
decrease (increase) in inequality if an observation with more (fewer) resources gives part of them to an
observation with fewer (more) resources) [40–42].
Despite these basic properties, inequality indexes differ from each other in how they aggregate
observations. Some indexes, such as the Gini index, are more sensitive to changes in the part of the
distribution with more observations, which is usually around the mean [41,43]. Others, such as the
Atkinson or Theil indexes, may attach more weight in the aggregation to the values in the tails of
the distribution. Therefore, what index is used depends on the issue to be addressed. Researchers
interested in income inequality may lean towards the use of indexes that put more weight on the lower
tail of the distribution; however, in environmental or natural resource applications, it may be more
convenient to use neutral indexes [27]. Table 1 summarizes the main characteristics of the inequality
indexes most widely used in social science.
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Table 1. Inequality indexes.
Formula * Main Characteristics
Gini Index [44]
1
2 t n2 ∑
m
i=1 ∑
m
j=1 ni nj
∣∣∣ti − tj∣∣∣ It is twice the area between the completely egalitarian
distribution and distribution in the Lorenz curve.
Between 0 (egalitarian distribution) and 1 (maximum
inequality).
More sensitive to changes in the part of the distribution with
more observations.
Atkinson Indexes [41]
1−
[
∑mi=1
ni
n
[
ti
t
]1−e] 11−e
for 0 < e 6= 1 Parameter e has to be selected from a normative point of view.
It represents the social inequality aversion. The higher e is,
the more aversion to inequality society has.
1−∏mi=i
(
ti
t
)ni/n
for e = 1 Between 0 (egalitarian distribution) and 1 (maximum
inequality).
More sensitive to changes in the tails of the distribution.
General Entropy Family Index [45,46]
1
β (β−1) ∑
m
i=1
ni
n
[(
ti
t
)β − 1] for β 6= 0, 1 Parameter β has to be selected from a normative point of view.
It represents the sensitiveness to the distance events at different
part of the distribution. The lower β is, the more sensitive the
measure is to changes in the lower tail.
∑mi=1
ni
n
ti
t ln
(
ti
t
)
for β = 1 Between 0 (egalitarian distribution) and a value that depends
on β and population (maximum inequality).
∑mi=1
ni
n ln
(
t
ti
)
for β = 0 The Theil index corresponds to β = 1 [40].
The Mean Logarithmic Deviation (MLD) corresponds to β = 0.
* ti and ni represent catches and population of country i for i = 1, 2...,m, respectively; n = ∑mi=1 ni is the global
population; and t = ∑mi=1
ni
n ti denotes the global weighted average catches.
Note that the General Entropy indexes for the case of β = 1 (Theil index) and β = 0 (MLD index)
requires applying logarithms to the level of catches. This is an important aspect for the analysis since
many countries have zero catches in the high seas. Following the advice of the FAO [47], we consider
that catches are equal to 1×10−25 tonnes for these cases to solve this deficiency.
2.4. The Decomposability of the Theil Index
When the individuals in a population can be classified in groups, it may be useful to decompose
the inequality observed for the whole population into the inequality generated within the groups and
the inequality due to differences between the groups. This is especially relevant in our study, where the
catches by countries can be sorted according to the fishing areas where they were harvested. In this
context, we are interested in learning what part of the inequality observed is due to differences within
and between the fishing areas.
The Theil index is one of the measures that enables the inequality to be decomposed additively
between and within groups [45,46]. When applied to our study, the decomposition of the Theil index
can be formally expressed as
T = Twithin + Tbetween,
being
Twithin =
K
∑
k=1
∑mki=1 ni,k · ti,k
∑mi=1 ni · ti
· Tk,
Tbetween =
K
∑
k=1
∑mki=1 ni,k · ti,k
∑mi=1 ni · ti
·
[
ln
(
n
nk
· ∑
mk
i=1 ni,k · ti,k
∑mi=1 ni · ti
)]
,
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where (apart from notation in Table 1) K is the number of fishing areas, mk is the number of countries
harvesting in the fishing area k, ni,k is the population of country i attributed to fishing area k and Tk is
the value of the Theil index calculated only on the population of group k.
Notice that the contribution of group k to total inequality, T, is given by (∑mki=1 ni,k · ti,k/∑mi=1 ni ·
ti)Tk. This term refers to the inequality within group k.
To apply the Theil decomposition to our study, it is necessary to attribute the population of
each country to all the fishing areas where each country operates. To this end, we follow the equal
distribution principle. By assuming an equal distribution of catches within the country, it is implied
that the cumulative distribution of catches and population coincide. In other words, we are assuming
that every percentage of the catches corresponds to the same percentage of population. Therefore,
when the catches of a country are split by areas, by the same principle, the proportion of population
attributed to each area corresponds to the share of total catches that they represent for the country.
Formally, the population of country i attributed to the catches coming from fishing area k is defined as
ni,k = ni ·
ti,k
ti
.
Consequently, the population attributed to a fishing area can be estimated by adding up the
population of all the countries that fish in it. Finally, adding up the populations of all fishing areas
gives us the global population.
3. Results
3.1. Catches Evolution
At a first glance, the data reflect that high seas catches have increased more than population
from 1960 to 2014. During this period, catches have risen by around 784.19% with respect to their
initial level, reaching the 2.5 million tons in 2014. As a consequence, the negligible share of high
seas in the global catches of the 1960s (0.73%) has enlarged (representing 2.56% of global catches in
2014). There may be multiple factors underlying this increase such as the rise in population (global
population grew from 3.03 billion in 1960 to 7.27 billion in 2014) [1], the technological advances in the
fishing activity [17,18], the overexploitation of the EEZs [16] and the governmental subsidization to the
long-distance fleets [19]. Contrary to global population, high seas catches have not increased steadily
during the period analyzed. In Figure 1, which illustrates the paths followed by each variable from
1960 to 2014, this fact can be easily appreciated by the contrast between the steady line representing
the population growth and the spiky one reflecting the path of catches.
Table 2 compares the evolution of population and catches focusing on their compound annual
growth rates. Over the whole period analyzed, the compound annual growth rate of catches (4.12%)
has more than doubled that in population (1.61%). This superiority of the catches growth rate seems to
hold through almost all the decades (the only exception is the 2000s, where the catches even seemed to
decrease). From 1960 to 1970, catches growth rate (3.2%) was already well above population growth
rate (1.96%). During the next decade, catches growth increased spectacularly (11.34%), leaving the
growth in population far below (1.88%). From 1980 to 2000, catches continued growing quickly with
respect to population, but more slowly each decade when compared to their previous rates. In the next
decade, catches growth rate became even negative (−0.76%), falling behind the population growth
rate (1.2%). During the last four years of the period analyzed, catches seem to have recovered their
previous positive growth rate (2.87%), overpassing again the corresponding population (1.11%).
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Figure 1. Evolution of high seas catches and population.
Table 2. Compound annual growth rates * of high seas catches and population (in %).
Period Catches Population
1960–1970 3.20 1.96
1970–1980 11.34 1.88
1980–1990 4.84 1.75
1990–2000 2.86 1.44
2000–2010 −0.76 1.20
2010–2014 2.87 1.11
1960–2014 4.12 1.61
* Calculated as (te/tb)1/n − 1 where te and tb represent the value of the variable at the end and beginning of
the period, respectively, and n is the number of the years.
3.2. Catches by Countries
Global catches are known to be heterogeneously distributed across countries [1]. Figure 2
compares the amount of high seas catches and population of each country in 1960 and 2014. Aiming
for a clearer representation, countries have been ordered by their level of catches. If fishery resources
were evenly distributed across population, differences in the catches of countries would correspond
to their demographic differences. Instead, it can be observed that dissimilarities in the catches of
countries are not accompanied by demographic variations neither in the beginning nor at the end of
the period analyzed. Nevertheless, Figure 2 clearly illustrates the increase in the number of countries
participating from high seas fisheries during the period analyzed [9]. In 1960, only a few countries
fished in high seas. In fact, 80.12% of countries reported zero catches and only one country (Japan)
reported catches above 100,000 tons. By 2014, the percentage of countries without fishing in high seas
decreased to 48.19% while the number of countries reporting catches above 100,000 tons increased
to eight (Indonesia, Korea, Ecuador and Spain are the top ones). From the inequality viewpoint,
the distribution of catches from 2014 seems more equal as some countries that initially had zero catches
from high seas ended up with a positive level of these catches.
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(a) (b)
Figure 2. Distribution of high seas catches and population by countries: (a) 1960; and (b) 2014.
The evolution of inequality can be intuitively known by comparing the shares in catches and
population of countries within different quantiles of the catches distribution in different years. Table 3
presents the shares in catches and population held by the countries within each quintile of the catches
distribution in 1960 and 2014. As previously shown, this table reveals that countries in the lowest
quintiles are not obtaining enough resources according to the population they represent. By contrast,
the catches of countries within the largest quintiles over-represent their population. The quintile ratio
provides an idea on how much larger are the shares in catches or population (depending on the case)
of the countries in the last quintile with respect to those from the first quintile. Therefore, the closer
is this ratio to 1, the more homogeneous is the corresponding distribution. In our case, the catches
ratio is far above 1, reflecting that countries in the last quintile have levels of catches much larger than
countries in the first quintile. On the contrary, the ratio for population is below 1, indicating that the
share in population of the largest quintile is lower than that of the first one. Considering this, it can be
known that catches per capita are not evenly distributed across countries. Nevertheless, the decrease
in the catches quintile ratio and the simultaneous increase in the population ratio show that inequality
in the catches per capita has fallen during the period analyzed.
Table 3. Shares of global fishing catches by quintiles.
Group Share in Global... 1960 2014
1st quintile (less than 20%) Catches 0.03 0.08
Population 68.14 43.85
2nd quintile (20–40%) Catches 0.34 0.76
Population 1.05 4.22
3th quintile (40–60%) Catches 1.91 4.25
Population 12.97 7.33
4th quintile (60–80%) Catches 4.91 11.68
Population 2.50 1.56
5th quintile (80–100%) Catches 92.81 83.23
Population 15.34 43.03
Quintile ratio (S80/S20) Catches 3093.67 1040.38
Population 0.23 0.98
Even within quintiles, catches vary enormously from one country to another. In 1960, Japan
alone accounted for 70% of high seas catches. The Russian Federation and France were the following
countries with the largest shares of catches (11% and 3%, respectively). During the period analyzed,
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this concentration seems to have decreased extraordinarily. In 2014, Indonesia is the major fishing
entity with 11% of the catches. Very close to this share are the ones from the Republic of Korea
(with 10% of the global catches), Ecuador (with 8% of the global catches) and Spain (with 8% of the
global catches).
3.3. Catches by Fishing Areas
If catches are disaggregated by fishing areas, their geographical concentration becomes clear.
This information may be relevant for comparing the social pressure to which areas are exposed and
propose a redistribution of fishing activity such that overexploitation of certain areas is avoided and
global fisheries resources are more evenly distributed across population.
There are only a few areas that make significant contributions to high seas catches, the rest account
for a negligible proportion of the total distribution. Even though the share in total high seas catches of
specific fishing areas may have changed over time, the shape of the distribution persisted from 1960 to
2014 (see Figure 3).
The Pacific Ocean represents the major source of high seas catches during the period analyzed,
having increased its share in total high seas catches around 20% from 1960 to 2014. The Atlantic
represents the second major contributor to high seas catches although it has experienced a decrease
in its share of 8% from 1960 to 2014. These changes are in line with those observed by Sumaila and
Teh [9], who concluded that most countries have redirected their attention from species located in the
North Atlantic to other species spread all around the world.
Figure 3. Contribution of fishing areas to high seas catches and population. “Others” represent fishing
areas whose global catches and population were below 1% in 1960 and 2014.
Within the Pacific, the most exploited areas correspond to the Eastern and Western Central Pacific.
The former was the most relevant in 1960, but it is overpassed by the latter during the period analyzed.
Both together accounted for 25.33% of the 1960 catches and 49.08% of the 2014 ones. Japan was the
main fishing entity operating in both areas in 1960 with 85% of its catches. The prevalent position of
Japan vanished over time. In 2014, countries such as Mexico and Ecuador become the major fishing
entities in Eastern Central Pacific and Indonesia, the Republic of Korea and Philippines in Western
Central Pacific.
The asymmetry in the number of countries and the population within fishing areas explains some
of the heterogeneity in their catches. Nonetheless, considering the proportion of the global population
represented in each area fosters the notion of inequality in their catches. As can be observed in Figure 3,
there are some areas whose contribution to global catches is well below their share in global population
(such as the Atlantic or the Indian Ocean in 2014), whereas other areas have shares in global catches
larger than their percentage in the global population (such as the Pacific Ocean or the Indian Ocean
in 1960).
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3.4. Global Inequality in Catches
The evolution of the Lorenz curves for the distribution of catches shows that countries in the
middle and upper parts of the distribution have increased their share in total catches, bringing the curve
closer to the diagonal (Figure 4). Thus, it can be unambiguously claimed that the 2014 distribution is
more equal than the 1960 distribution.
Figure 4. Lorenz curves.
In addition to this graphic result, we are interested in quantifying the inequality in the
international distribution of fisheries resources from 1960 to 2014. In particular, we calculated the Gini
index, the Atkinson index with parameters 2 (A(2)) and 0.5 (A(0.5)), the Theil index and the Mean
Logarithmic Deviation (MLD). Figure 5 illustrates the results. To provide a clearer view of the multiple
paths of inequality suggested by the indexes, the inequality values for 1960 are taken as a reference
and normalized to 100. Positive and negative fluctuations of inequality place indexes above and below
100, respectively. This enables the magnitude of the changes in inequality to be compared over the
period analyzed.
Several features can be highlighted from the evolution of the inequality indexes (Figure 5).
As previously seen through the evolution of the Lorenz curves, the distribution of catches across
countries has become more homogeneous during the period analyzed. In particular, it can be observed
that inequality in the distribution of catches has decreased between 29% and 65% from 1960 to 2014,
depending on the index. Instead of being monotonic, the evolution of indexes experiences fluctuations
from one year to another. Nevertheless, three periods can be clearly distinguished. From 1960 to the
mid-1980s, inequality follows a decreasing trend (the largest variation found in the indexes during
this period does not represent more than 34% of the initial level). A few years after the recognition
of EEZs by the UNCLOS in 1982 [7], the decreasing trend in inequality intensifies. This change in
the behavior of inequality seems reasonable once the EEZ came into effect, as many fleets operating
in the EEZ of foreign countries had to move toward other stocks, in most cases, located in high seas.
This was especially the case of the fisheries from the US and Canada and to a considerable lesser extent
those fisheries in Northwest Africa [48]. These movements decreased inequality as high seas areas
became exploited by more countries. During the last stage, 2000–2014, inequality continues decreasing,
but more smoothly. This is due to the stability observed in catches (see Figure 1) mainly produced by
the boom in aquaculture in this period [49].
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Figure 5. Evolution of inequality.
Another remarkable feature illustrated in Figure 5 is the differences observed between the indexes
over time. With the exception of the A(2), all indexes show similar trends. In particular, the trend
in A(2) distinguishes for being quite flat. This has also been observed in other studies analyzing
distributional issues on environmental resources [27] and is due to the inherent characteristics of the
Atkinson family of indexes. A(2) is an index which takes into close consideration the observations
located at the bottom of the distribution. This implies that, in our case, the A(2) pays especial attention
to countries with zero catches from high seas. Even though their proportion has decreased over the
period analyzed, there is still a large amount of countries with zero catches. Thus, changes in the
inequality when focusing on the bottom part of the catches distribution are negligible. In this sense,
we do not consider that A(2) represents the equity in exploitation of fisheries resources well. The rest
of the indexes show similar trends, but the differences among them are relevant from the quantitative
viewpoint. The Gini index shows the smallest variation in inequality (apart from the A(2) index) over
time, because it is very sensitive to changes in the part of the distribution with most observations,
i.e., the low tail of the distribution, in our case. The differences observed in the trend of the Theil
index and the MLD also reflect the inherent characteristics of this family of indexes. Both belong to the
General Entropy family (Table 1), but the Theil index is more sensitive to changes in the upper tail than
the MLD. This is why the former quantifies more inequality than the latter for the same distribution.
3.5. Decomposition of Inequality by Fishing Areas: Biology vs. Technology
The decomposability property of the Theil index allows calculating how much of the inequality
observed in fishery catches can be explained by differences between fishing areas and how much by
differences across countries operating within those areas. The between component would represent
mostly the biological differences between the fishing areas (species, biodiversity, nutrients availability,
temperature, climate conditions, etc.). The within component would represent the differences across
the fleets fishing within the area. These differences may reflect the technological characteristics of
the fleets (fishing gear, vessel size and power, and EEZ boundary), the fishermen capacities or the
food preferences of population among countries. Since large dissimilarities in the fleets and fishermen
capacity of countries are outlined in [1] and differences in the preferences for fish consumption are
difficult to measure and may be overpassed by preferences for exporting fish, we associate this
component of the inequality, roughly speaking, with technology.
Figure 6 illustrates the evolution of the total inequality and the between and within components
of the inequality in the catches of countries from 1960 to 2014. For an easier comparison of the
contributions of each component, these results are not normalized using the initial year as in Figure 5.
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There are two facts worth highlighting in Figure 6. On the one hand, we observe that inequality has
reduced more than 33% in relative terms between 1960 and 2014. Since the maximum value of the
Theil index is given by Ln(n) being in our case n = 166, we can say that in 1960 the inequality in the
use of fishing resources was about 51% of the maximum inequality while in 2014 the inequality was
about 18%.
Figure 6. Between and within inequality decomposition of the Theil index.
On the other hand, Figure 6 shows that inequality in the high seas catches of countries has been
mostly produced by differences within fishing areas during the period analyzed. That is, most of the
inequality observed is due to the dissimilarity in the average catches between the fleets operating
within the same area. This is in line with Sumaila and Teh [9], who found that only more industrialized
countries can access and exploit high seas, being the least developed countries limited to the nearest
areas. Nevertheless, the gap between the between and the within components narrows over time to
the point that the between component exceeds the within component in the last years of the sample.
This evolution reflects the technological catching up across countries.
Table 4 quantifies the Theil decomposition for the key years in percentage terms. As shown
in Figure 6, the inequality observed seems to have been mainly motivated by inequality among
countries fishing within the same area (between 45% and 82% of the total inequality is explained by
this component). Although its initial contribution seems to maintain at a lower levels during the first
decades, the within inequality experiences a noticeable increase in the 1990s. This spike might be
explained by the implementation of the EEZ in the 1980s. Due to the new legislation, many countries
lost their free access to coastal waters previously exploited. In the short term, these countries may
have decided to keep their levels of catches by expanding their fishing activities to high seas areas.
This sudden movement of the fleets might have result in a quasi-random spread of vessels around
global waters, which decreases the biological inequality. At the same time, countries enforced to leave
the coastal waters may not have such productive fleets to fish in high seas areas. Consequently, there is
more heterogeneity in the fleets of these areas, resulting in the observed increase in within inequality.
Over the last decades of the period analyzed, the percentage contribution of the within inequality
has decreased, which reflects the greater reliance of more countries on high seas fisheries and their
catching up on fishing technology. Indeed, in the last years, the within inequality has overpassed the
between inequality, which reflects that catches dissimilarities are rather generated by the idiosyncrasies
of the areas exploited.
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Table 4. Proportion of inequality from between and within fishing areas.
Year Within Between
1960 80.89 19.11
1970 46.57 53.43
1980 55.38 44.62
1990 81.94 18.06
2000 62.50 37.50
2010 60.68 39.32
2014 45.71 54.29
When decomposing the Theil index intobetween and within inequality, we can compute the
contribution of each area to the latter component. Figure 7 shows the contribution of fishing
areas to the within component. Note that a small (large) contribution by a particular area indicates
that the distribution of catches among the countries fishing within this area is quite homogeneous
(heterogeneous).
Figure 7. Contribution of fishing areas to the within inequality. “Others” represents fishing areas whose
contribution was below 1% in the years shown.
In aggregate terms, Figure 7 shows that the Pacific has been responsible for around half of the
within inequality observed during the whole period. The Atlantic, which generated one third of the
initial within inequality, presents half of its initial share by the end of the period. On the contrary,
the Indian Ocean has slightly increased its percentage contribution to within inequality during the
period analyzed. Even though there is not a single area standing out above the rest, noticeable changes
have occurred from 1960 to 2014.
On the one hand, areas such as the Western Central Pacific, the Southeast Pacific, the Eastern
Indian Ocean, the Antarctic Atlantic or the Eastern Central Atlantic have increased their percentage
contribution to within inequality. Within the Western Central Pacific, the concentration of catches
seems to have decreased from 1960 to 2014. In the beginning of the period, around 84% of the catches
were held by Japan, which represented only 4% of the population of this area. At the end, the largest
fisher in this area are Indonesia (with 21% of the catches) and the Republic of Korea (with 20% of
the catches), representing 13% and 3% of the population, respectively. Despite this decrease in the
percentage concentration, the rise in the catches of this area (Figure 3) has motivated such enlargement
of the contribution of the within contribution. In the Southeast Pacific, Japan represented 85% of the
initial catches, with less than 2% of the population. By the end of the period analyzed, the major fishing
entity in this area is Ecuador with 50% of the catches and approximately 4% of the population. In this
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case, it can also be observed that, although there has been a noticeable decrease in the concentration of
percentage catches in this area, the increase in the absolute levels of catches (Figure 3) results in an
increase in the contribution of this area to within inequality. Regarding the Eastern Indian Ocean, Japan
initially was responsible of all the catches in this area, representing less than 8% of the population.
In 2014, Spain becomes the major fishing entity with one third of the catches and 4% of the population
of the area. Again, the increase in catches has produced the increased observed in the within inequality
despite the fall in the concentration of percentage catches. The increase in the within contribution of
the Antarctic Atlantic is explained by the fact that this area started to be exploited during the period
analyzed. Within the Eastern Central Atlantic, there has been also a decrease in the concentration of
percentage catches. In particular, the initial major fishing entity was Malta, with 71% of the catches
of this area and 0.2% of its population. Ghana constitutes the largest final fishing entity of this area,
representing 24% of the catches and 10% of the population in this area. The boost in the absolute
catches of this area (Figure 3) motivates the increase in its contribution to the within inequality.
On the other hand, areas such as the Northwest Pacific, the Southwest Atlantic or the Northern
Atlantic have decreased their share in the within inequality. In the Northwest Pacific, the decrease in the
concentration of percentage catches is noticeable, which may explain the decrease in its contribution to
within inequality. Particularly, it can be found that this area was initially mostly exploited by Japan
(92%), a country which only accounted for 6% of the population. Finally, Indonesia holds the largest
amount of catches (32%) while only represents 12% of the population. In the case of the Southwest
Atlantic, the concentration of major percentage catches seems to maintain over the period analyzed.
Nevertheless, the decrease observed in the catches of this area (Figure 3) explains the reduction in the
within contribution of this area. While the concentration of the percentage catches of the major fishing
entities in the Northeast Atlantic decreases, that in the Northwest Atlantic increases. Catches in both
of these areas decrease, contributing to the decrease in the within inequality in Northeast Atlantic and
producing the negative variation in the within inequality of the Northwest Atlantic.
4. Discussion and Conclusions
While perfectly equal distributions may threat the target of resources conservation by allowing
numerous agents to exploit a limited resource, sustainability policies are also compromised by very
unequal distributions, where less benefited agents may not be as prompt to burden with the same
costs [50–52]. This analysis aims to help policy makers through the illustration of the fishery resources
distribution, which may contribute to know the general predisposition of countries to participate in a
common conservation plan.
It is well known that fishery catches have traditionally been concentrated in a few countries and
fishing areas. This article quantifies the distributional issues that emerge when fisheries exploitation is
analyzed over time by applying the inequality metrics used in social science.
Other articles have also used inequality metrics to study different issues arising in fisheries economics.
Sumaila et al. [53] used the Gini index to quantify the distributional effects on profits of the closure of
the high seas to fishing. The Gini index was also used by Da Rocha and Sempere [54] to measure the
redistributive effects of restricting the tradability of individual transferable quotas. Bellanger et al. [38]
used the Theil index and its decomposability property to determine the distributional effects of various
quota allocation systems among producer organizations. Unlike these articles, our study does not set
out to assess the distributional effect of a particular management fisheries policy, but rather to show
the unequal use of worldwide fisheries resources over time.
We address the distributional analysis of marine resources as a global common considering
catches exclusively from high seas. Catches from the EEZs are not considered a common resource
because, from the legal point of view, they are fully under the national jurisdiction of a particular
state [7]. In this context, all inequality indexes confirm that the use of fishing resource is very unequal
across countries. However, this use has become more equal over time, with inequality decreasing by
between 29% and 65% from 1960 to 2014. This study also shows that, when the geographical origin
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of the catches is taken into account, until 2000 more than three quarters of the inequality observed
in fishing catches is due to technological and fishermen capacity differences across the countries
operating within fishing areas. This trend is in line with the results of Sumaila et al. [53], who found
that the number of countries fishing in shared areas has doubled from 1950 to 2006. However, this
percentage has decreased by more than 35% in the last few decades, reflecting the greater reliance of
more countries on high seas fisheries and their catching up on fishing technology. In fact, in the last
years of the sample, the between component has exceeded the within component reflecting the fact that
the biological differences between the fishing areas may have widened.
All these findings are very relevant from the policy viewpoint. Policies seeking to ensure the
sustainability of marine resources have to take these equity issues into account in the management of
the international high seas [9]. Jointly with the distribution of fishing effort, the catches of the areas
reported in this analysis may provide an idea on whether fishing areas can be further exploited or need
to be preserved from their unsustainable exploitation, helping countries to homogenize their catches by
redirecting their fishing activity to more productive areas. Nonetheless, an egalitarian use of the fishing
resources has to be aligned with other actions that guarantee an equitable use. Other factors such as
dependence (i.e., food security), traditional access to the resource or development needs also have to
be taken into account for the sustainability of the resource [8,55,56]. These recommendations are also
aligned with the awareness campaigns that promote the sustainability of fisheries by advocating for an
eco-labeling of fish that includes information such as the origin of the fish [57,58] or the way in which
it has been caught [59].
The search for an egalitarian use of the fishing resources is compatible with the view of the sea
as common heritage of mankind rather than a free and open access resource [60,61]. Some proposals
for protecting fishing resources consider the closure of the high seas [53], the creation of (no-take)
marine reserves [62–64], or the zoning of the entire oceans, not just the land margin [65]. Our result
are a support for all these proposals as long as the distributional effects are taken into account in the
analysis, as Sumaila et al. [53] did for the case of the high seas closure.
One of the shortcomings of our analysis is that it does not incorporate the management
frameworks. Our approach quantifies the inequality of the use of fisheries resource along time
but it is not able to explain the reasons of this inequality. High seas are governed by the RFMOs with
different management powers to set rules that condition the fishing decisions of the fleets. Even though
some of the measures adopted for the RFMOs do not advocate the equal exploitation of the stocks
fisheries, this is the case of the European Common Fisheries Policy that allocates quotas among the
state members according to the Principle of Relative Stability, which takes into account the historical
catch records instead of their population [66,67]. In the same line, our approach it is not able a priori
to take explicitly into account the biological differences of the fishing areas; however, it is able to
distinguish a posteriori how much of the inequality observed in fishing catches can be explained by
differences between fishing areas, which we take mainly as biological differences.
Further research on the availability of fishery substitutes (aquaculture), jointly with an economic
valuation of the profits obtained from the commercialization of the catches (including exports), would
provide more precise information on the initial willingness of countries to participate in international
conservation plans for fisheries. Our analysis skips from the fact that some countries export most of
their catches and import other fish products due to the food preference of their people. For instance,
Japan exported 16% of fish captured in 2016, according to the FAO data. In contrast, United States
exported 31% of fish captured that same year [68,69]. Nonetheless, analyzing the exploitation patterns,
instead of consumption patters, allows us to account for that part of the resource that is captured
and exported to other countries. We are implicitly assuming that local population benefits from
these exports. From an economic perspective, it would be of interest to quantify the inequality in the
distribution of the profits derived from exploitation of the fisheries resources. In [19], the authors
analyzed the profits of several countries obtained very recently from exploitation of high seas fisheries.
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Some studies (e.g., [70,71]) focus on the distribution of profits across agents from specific fisheries but,
as far as we know, no studies analyze the distribution of the profits from fishing between countries.
Inequality metrics can be applied to many other distributional concerns of interest in fisheries.
One of the shortcomings of our analysis is that catches are taken as a pool without distinguish by
species or taxon or by the type of vessel used for harvesting. However, it could be interesting to analyze
the distribution of catches by (groups of) species or by types of vessels instead of geographical areas.
Finally, it is worth noting that the catch data used in this study come from the reconstructed series
by Pauly and Zeller [36] in the Sea Around Us project [35]. Some studies (e.g., [72]) show that data
reported to the FAO in recent years by some countries such as China and Myanmar are unreliable
because increases in catches may be politically expedient. Moreover, Pauly and Zeller [73] highlighted
the importance of retroactive corrections in FAO time series to avoid a “presentist bias”. Researchers
from the FAO refute these criticisms, although they are open to new research that may help to improve
their statistical data on fisheries [74]. In this context of discussion, we have repeated our analysis with
the FAO data for the case of the global catches. Results with the FAO data are qualitatively similar to
those presented in this article.
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